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Abstract
This article describes how a public transportation system in a mid-sized southern
state was assessed in regard to its adequacy in providing transportation services. The
article begins by discussing the trends in current transportation patterns, funding
of public transit, and special populations served by public transit. A case study is
then presented of a transit system that was experiencing what has become a typical
problem for similar transit systems across the nation: intensified public and political
pressures caused by funding cuts and unfunded mandates from the federal government. Findings from the case study are then provided along with recommendations
for change. Finally, the outcome of the study is presented.

Introduction
The personal automobile continues to be the favored mode of transportation
in the United States, in spite of public support for mass transit. A recent survey
showed that about 10 percent of Americans use public transit regularly (Larwin
2005). Thus, the vast majority of Americans rely on their personal automobiles to
meet their transportation needs. Factors that have resulted from increased reliance on automobiles include the expansion of urban boundaries, urban planning
that discourages use of public transit, rising numbers of those who own a car, a
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readily available freeway system, and long commuting trips to areas where there is
no public transit service. However, there are those who simply do not have access
to an automobile and who rely solely on public transit to get them to and from
work, medical appointments, child care facilities, and leisure activity sites.
In large metropolitan areas with well-utilized public transit systems, riders are
more diverse in regard to socioeconomic status. However, in small to mid-size
cities, riders tend to be predominantly poor and live in the innercity. In regard
to planning, transit operators across the United States are increasingly pressured
to provide transportation services to those with automobiles who live in outlaying areas. This emphasis on commuter-oriented express (both bus and rail), in
many respects, directly conflicts with transportation services that are increasingly
needed in the innercity. The working poor are particularly at risk in that adequate
and reliable transportation is seen as a primary barrier to self-sufficiency (PerryBurney and Jennings 2003), in addition to getting and keeping a job (Brabo et al.
1997).

Conditions for Crisis
In the United States, public transit service is subsidized to a great extent. However,
since 1980 Congress has increasingly reduced transit funding, leaving greater fiscal responsibility on state and local governments for funding public transit services. Additionally, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) placed unfunded
mandates on local transit, which were required to provide door-to-door service
for those who were disabled. Transit officials also had to expand their fleet of
small buses to accommodate this mandate or re-equip existing buses for easier
access. More stringent federal emissions regulations required that many buses be
replaced with more energy-efficient ones.
When combined, these factors have placed a great deal of pressure on local governments to continue providing quality services, while at the same time experiencing cuts in funding. In several areas of the United States, transit authorities, with
support from state legislatures and local government leaders, have attempted to
offset these funding cuts with various combinations of state funding, motor vehicle taxes, and the collection of local taxes directed specifically for transit (Chan et
al. 2003). The following is a case study of one such public transit system that found
itself at the crossroads of having to make significant changes in order to continue
offering high-quality and reliable transit services to the population it served. In
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many respects, this case study reflects the realities that are faced by several transit
systems in small and mid-sized cities across the United States.

Case Study Background
In February 2003, a Pulaski County (Arkansas) judge, in conjunction with the
mayors of Little Rock, North Little Rock, Maumelle, and Sherwood and the Central
Arkansas Transit Authority (CATA) board president, sent a letter to the University
of Arkansas at Little Rock (UALR) chancellor requesting that the university conduct an analysis of the adequacy of transit service provided by CATA. Their specific concerns focused on issues of affordability, maintaining standards of service,
financing, governance, and future developments in regard to CATA.
In April 2003, the UALR chancellor convened a 10-member multidisciplinary task
force comprising those with expertise in business, public administration, organizational design, engineering, finance, communication, social work, marketing, law,
political science, and urban studies.

Central Arkansas Transit Authority
History of Structure and Governance
From 1950 to 1972, the transit system in the Little Rock area was privately owned
and operated. During this period, three private entities attempted to make a
profit on transit operations and failed. A 1971 study recommended that the
transit system shift to public ownership under the direction of a regional authority. Area leaders formed a transit policy board (Metroplan), made up of elected
officials from Pulaski and surrounding counties, and in 1972 the Central Arkansas
Transit Authority (CATA) began operations as a publicly-owned entity (Chan et
al. 2003).
In 1986, Pulaski County, along with the cities of Little Rock, North Little Rock,
Cammack Village, Maumelle, Sherwood, and Jacksonville (Jacksonville withdrew
in 1987) entered into an Interlocal Agreement that established CATA in its current form. The agreement was deemed necessary because these local governments
were being asked to infuse increasing amounts of money into CATA and wanted
more of a say in the operations. Additionally, at the time it was determined that
CATA was not being managed or supervised effectively as a transit operation
(Chan et al. 2003).
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The Interlocal Agreement determined that CATA would be governed by a 13member board of directors whose members would be appointed for four-year,
staggered terms by the six participating area governments that oversee CATA.
Board membership is representative of the funding percentage by each participating government. As the largest financial contributor at the time of this study,
Little Rock had five members appointed by the Little Rock board of directors, two
of whom were City employees. Three CATA board members were appointed by
the mayor of North Little Rock, one of whom was a City employee, and two were
appointed by the Pulaski County judge, one of whom was a County employee.
Finally, three board members were appointed by the mayors of the three additional communities that CATA served, one of whom was a City employee at the
time of this study (Chan et al. 2003).
History of Funding and Finance
Until the 1970s, federal funds accounted for up to half of operating funds. Starting
in 1984, funds were reduced, and then in 1990–1991 there was a total withdrawal
of federal operating funds for public transit. CATA, along with transit authorities
across the nation, was faced with the dilemma of finding alternative sources of
funding. Among the options were taking a portion of highway revenues and applying them to local transit, creating a dedicated funding source, and/or creating a
combination of state and local taxes, in addition to fares.
In regard to securing dedicated funding sources for transit, several states have
gone to levying sales taxes (Las Vegas; New York City Transit; Mass Bay Transit,
Massachusetts), property taxes (Bay Area Rapid Transit, California; New York City
Transit), and fuel taxes (Metropolitan Transit, Tennessee; San Diego Transit). In
regard to local dedicated funding sources for public transit, several cities have
implemented sales taxes (Foothill Transit, Los Angeles County; Norwalk Transit, California), property taxes (Birmingham-Jefferson Transit, Alabama; Orange
County Transit, California), and fuel taxes (Los Angeles County Metro; Washington DC Metro) (Federal Transit Administration 2006).
In CATA’s case, funding at the local level was established by a mileage formula
within the 1986 Interlocal Agreement. Contributions were based on revenue
miles, resulting in Little Rock at 73.29 percent; North Little Rock, 18.64 percent;
Pulaski County, 7.09 percent; and Maumelle, Sherwood, and Cammack Village all
less than 1 percent. Due to operations and capital expenditures, the local governments grew from 1986 to 2002. During that time, Little Rock’s appropriations
to CATA grew from $2 million to $4.5 million in 2001. Fiscal crisis and deficits
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prompted reduced service in 2002 and 2003. At the time of this study, 78 percent
of CATA funds were obtained at the local level, 20 percent were derived from fares
(farebox revenue totaled $1.3 million), and approximately 2 percent came from
state revenues (Central Arkansas Transit Authority 2002).
Additionally, the ADA created unfunded mandates on local transit to provide
door-to-door service for the disabled. A large proportion of funds was needed
to equip buses for increased accessibility for those who had disabilities. Finally,
tighter federal air emission standards required that CATA replace its fleet of buses
to meet the new standards.
As a result of a funding crisis, in 1993 voters of Little Rock adopted a half-cent
sales tax earmarked, in part, for public transit. This was a particularly important
development, especially since CATA receives a small percentage of its operating
budget from the State (Arkansas ranks last among all states in transit spending.).
The increased tax revenue was distributed to the general funds of participating cities, where transit funds would compete with police, fire, and solid waste disposal
services. During each yearly budgetary session, CATA was placed in the position
of lobbying local government leaders for its share of the funds. CATA became
engrossed in a year-to-year struggle to maintain even minimal transit services. As
operating costs have increased dramatically over the past several years, this process had become quite contentious (Chan et al. 2003).
CATA responded to fiscal stress by reducing its staff (CATA had the smallest professional staff of all comparable systems studied) and cutting back service hours
through route contraction. A reduction in service, along with the publicized budget battles, resulted in deterioration of the public’s image of and trust in the public
transportation system.
Demographics, Current Operations, and Rider Profile
At the time of this case study, CATA had 45 large buses, 10 small buses, and 18 vans
in daily use. The authority provided 21 regular fixed-routes, 10 express routes, and
paratransit services. CATA served 8,000 to 9,000 riders per day, of which almost 60
percent were employed full-time, another 15 percent were employed part-time,
and 8 percent were students. Thus, 83 percent of CATA consumers were economically active outside the home or were students in preparation for work life.
CATA’s standard of bus frequency, regardless of day or whether peak/off peak
hours, is that there should be one bus every 30 minutes at designated stops. In
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2002, however, a number of weekday buses typically required more than 30 minutes to make the route.
The income of CATA riders was low, with 56 percent making less than $20,000
a year. Those who had incomes between $10, 000 and $14,999 represented the
highest percentage of riders. Only 13 percent of riders reported income of $40,000
or more. Those who used the bus seven days a week had lower incomes than
those who used the bus five or six days a week. Seven-day riders were thus more
transit dependent as a result of their low incomes. Seventy-two percent of riders
were above the age of 31, and a large percent (73%) were African American. More
than 80 percent of CATA riders lived in households with no car (Central Arkansas
Transit Authority 2002).

Case Study
Participants
Six bus riders and 53 public transit stakeholders (community leaders, CATA
board/staff members, and area experts on public transportation) participated in
the case study.
Public Transit Stakeholders. This group included Little Rock City board members,
CATA staff and board members, area mayors, the executive director of Metroplan,
the Little Rock City manager, and several area experts on transportation and the
poor.
Experts on services to the poor included one executive director of a public service
agency that works on behalf of the poor, three case managers from this same
organization, and one executive staff member from the Department of Human
Services.
Bus Riders. Riders who took part in this case study comprised daily consumers of
CATA. They included underrepresented minorities, those economically disadvantaged who were currently employed, and long-time users of the CATA system.
Participants in this group included two men and four women. There were four
African Americans and two European-Americans. Two members were daily bus
rides at the lower end of the economic scale (working class at a service industry
pay scale). Four participants had physical disabilities, were enrolled in programs at
Goodwill, and were receiving assistance to help them become more independent
and self-reliant through job training, job placement, or life skills development.
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Data Collection
Information for the case study was collected over a period of five months. The task
force reviewed previous reports and surveys that involved CATA and its operations, conducted structured interviews, and performed an analysis of CATA and
its operations compared to other transit systems in comparable-size cities. Participants were interviewed either face-to-face or within the context of a small group.
A set of structured interview questions was developed by task force members
to achieve uniformity in information and to assure that important themes were
adequately captured by all participants who were interviewed.

Findings and Recommendations
Findings from this case study were organized into three separate categories: (1)
funding and structural factors, (2) governance, and (3) operational conditions.
Funding and Structural Factors
A consistent theme that emerged from the case study was the funding crises
in public transit. At the time of this case study, CATA was struggling to meet
its already-reduced services and had no anticipated funds to expand services in
needed areas. From its findings, the task force recommended two strategies: (1)
seek additional funding for current operations by securing a countywide hotel/
motel lodging tax of $1 per bed per night and (2) mount a campaign to pass a
countywide, one-fourth cent sales tax dedicated to transit in the area. It was anticipated that such funding would act to secure a dedicated funding source for CATA
and put an end to the yearly budget battles. Such funds would then allow CATA
to not only fund its current operations more predictably and autonomously, but
also would allow the operation to grow and develop as a public system. Ending the
yearly budget battles, which are publicized, would create conditions where CATA
could begin to rebuild its public image as a reliable transportation alternative.
Governance
A common theme that emerged from the interviews with those familiar with
the structure of the CATA board was that its composition was problematic. The
current structure of having City and County employees occupying key positions
on the CATA board was perceived by participants as being a conflict of interest.
Several participants believed that the current structure focused more on the status quo of service delivery and was more maintenance versus leadership oriented.
From these findings, the task force recommended that City and County employ29
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ees should not serve as CATA board members. Instead, it was recommended that
the board be restructured to include a mix of elected officials and other residents
who have no major governmental or public agency affiliation. The task force
anticipated that this change in composition would build a more independent and
more regionally focused board that could effect change (Chan et al. 2003).
The case study also found that transit in Central Arkansas had outgrown the
conditions present when the 1986 Interlocal Agreement was formed. The task
force recommended that, in its place, a Regional Transit Authority be established.
The authority would be governed by a board consisting of the mayors and the
county judge. The Interlocal Agreement would create a legal entity separate from
the previous jurisdictions. The authority would have the power to issue revenue
bonds, but would not have an independent authority to tax. The Regional Transit Authority would be responsible for operating a transit system that satisfies
the basic needs of equity, accessibility, and special needs, as well as for planning
economic development, land use, and work access that is securely connected to
transit. Decisions regarding transit would not be made in isolation, but rather as
an integrated part of regional development (Chan et al. 2003).
Operational Conditions
Findings from this component of the case study were obtained primarily from bus
riders and local experts on transportation and the poor. Both riders and experts
perceived a lack of adequate service for those working shifts and nontraditional
work hours in locations where no public transportation is available or is limited.
All the participants in this group were aware that major growth was occurring in
the western region of the city where bus service is limited. In many instances, social
service providers and case managers had little trouble getting jobs for their clients,
but had great difficulty getting them to and from these jobs. Bus rider participants
expressed overall distrust in public transit. They were acutely aware of services
being cut and had no confidence that the routes they currently relied on, most
particularly on weekends, would continue. Other barriers to adequate transportation expressed by riders were not living near a bus route, limitations in the number
and frequency of routes, limitations in the hours and days of operation (limited on
Sundays), and difficulty in trip chaining.
Based on these findings, the task force recommended that a reverse-commute
service be added to assist those dependent on transit to reach work in suburban
fringe areas. The task force also proposed expanded paratransit services for dis30
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abled riders and urged CATA to begin working with major employers to attract
and retain employees who rely on public transit. A cost feasibility analysis would
be needed to justify the implementation of these recommendations.

Outcome of the Case Study
On September 27, 2005, the Metroplan board of directors approved a final draft
of METRO 2030, the region’s federally mandated long-range transportation plan.
METRO 2030 was built on previous efforts that produced METRO 2020 in 1995 and
METRO 2025 in 2000. The policies put forth in METRO 2030 represent a series of
strategies that determine the region’s planning and transportation direction. In
regard to public transit, the plan recommended that new funding sources be identified and developed with the goal of doubling the size and service of the bus transit
system. Longer range plans included bus rapid transit, light rail, or commuter rail
systems. The plan also called for proposals for dedicated local funding for transit
projects. METRO 2030 recommended retaining current fixed routes, adding more
routes, increasing frequency of routes, extending express service from Little Rock
to West Little Rock, extending service hours, and providing Sunday service. The
plan also included expansion of paratransit services over the planning period. In
addition, during the planning period, funding for CATA would increase from $307
million to $758 million. The additional $451 million represents 2-1/2 times more
service and service hours when compared to existing transit service. The additional
funding is expected from a .25 cent local option sales tax levied in Pulaski County
within the first five years of the plan. Such a strategy would require the referral of
the tax to voters by the Pulaski Quorum Court, in addition to a successful campaign to gain voter approval (Metroplan 2005).

Conclusions
It is axiomatic that the success of an assessment on any organization and the services it provides lies in the utilization of its recommendations by its stakeholders.
The findings and recommendations from this case study were presented to all the
stakeholders mentioned above and to the general public. It was encouraging to
find that several of the central recommendations (primarily around service delivery and funding) were reflected in Metroplan’s METRO 2030 final draft.
As evidenced in this case study, no single solution will solve the problems related
to public transit. Public transportation has become, in most metropolitan areas,
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conceptualized as a social service for the poor. To be productive participants in
society, those who are economically disadvantaged must have access to reliable
transportation that gets them to and from work every day. There is increasing
pressure placed on those who rely on government subsidy to seek employment,
and there are significant barriers to getting and keeping jobs for the poor. As these
pressures mount, it is imperative that communities work toward improving the
reliability and availability of public transportation. Any effort toward significant
and lasting change must involve the entire community in a coordinated effort that
focuses on several factors simultaneously. In an effort to bring about substantial
change in services to the poor, organizations, such as the one presented in this
article, must be assessed in such a way that considers the complex array of internal
and external factors that impact that particular organization and the services it
provides.
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